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The real danger is the gradual erosion of individual liberties 
through the automation, integration, and interconnection of many 
small, separate record-keeping systems, each of which alone may 
seem innocuous, even benevolent, and wholly justifiable. 
  U.S. Privacy Protection Study Commission, 1977 
INTRODUCTION 
he Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
the right for “people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”1 Underlying 
this phrase are guiding principles that have deep roots reaching as far 
as the Roman Empire. For instance, Roman statesman Cicero stated, 
“[w]hat is more inviolable . . . than the house of a citizen[?] . . . This 
place of refuge is so sacred to all men, that to be dragged from thence 
is unlawful.”2 
But how do historic principles apply to modern society? The 
Fourth Amendment traditionally protected papers located in homes or 
in luggage.3 Today, however, information is no longer constrained to 
	
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
2 NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 15 (1937). 
3 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928) (recognizing the “well-
known historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment” as preventing warrantless searches of 
a person’s house, papers, and effects) overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967); see also Morgan Cloud, A Liberal House Divided: How the Warren Court 
T
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fading parchment. Information and methods of communication have 
transcended into a digital era, where ideas and beliefs reside in 
computer systems in distant locations that are maintained by third 
parties. Thus, it is not always clear how the Fourth Amendment 
applies to the information age. 
Many argue that the Fourth Amendment was designed to adapt to 
the constantly changing conditions of life. Justice Louis D. Brandeis 
adopted this position in 1928 when addressing government 
wiretapping, saying: 
The progress of science in furnishing the government with means of 
espionage is not likely to stop with wire tapping. Ways may some 
day be developed by which the government, without removing 
papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by 
which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate 
occurrences of the home . . . . Can it be that the Constitution affords 
no protection against such invasions of individual security?4 
Justice Brandeis’s prediction has become a reality. Since 1928, 
technology has seen many changes, but most significantly for this 
Comment is the advent of smartphones. “Smartphones” are defined as 
portable devices that are capable of more than communication via 
voice and SMS (texting).5 They have the capability to remotely 
browse the Internet, access e-mail, download third-party applications, 
provide turn-by-turn directions by connecting to global positioning 
satellites, and more.6 Additionally, smartphones transmit “location 
data,” information that enables service providers to determine the 
location of the phone, and thus, the user, with shocking precision.7 
Law enforcement has utilized location data to efficiently 
investigate and prosecute crimes.8 For instance, it once took the U.S. 
	
Dismantled the Fourth Amendment, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 33, 33 (2005) (recognizing the 
dissolution between property law and privacy law). 
4 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
5 Daniel Zamani, There’s an Amendment for That: A Comprehensive Application of 
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence to Smart Phones, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 169, 169–
70 (2010). 
6 Id.; Jordan Robertson, Your Phone, Yourself: When is Tracking Too Much?, U.S.A. 
TODAY (Apr. 23, 2011, 10:39 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2011-04-23         
-smartphone-tracking.htm. 
7 See In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location 
Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 751 (S.D. Tex. 2005); Noam Cohen, It’s Tracking Your Every 
Move and You May Not Even Know, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2011, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/26/business/media/26privacy.html. 
8 See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, ACLU: FBI Used ‘Dragnet’-Style Warrantless Cell 
Tracking, CNET NEWS (June 22, 2010, 9:37 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3     
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Marshals Service an average of forty-two days to track a fugitive.9 It 
now takes the U.S. Marshals Service a mere two days to accomplish 
this same task.10 Having immediate access to location data allows law 
enforcement to deploy available resources effectively while reducing 
undue risk to officers and the public.11 
Some worry that law enforcement’s use of location data can pose 
an objective harm, as they fear that the government will subject the 
public to non-stop surveillance. Judge Flaum from the Seventh Circuit 
noted that “[t]he constitutional ill of prolonged or mass use of GPS 
technology would not necessarily be based on the information 
acquired by the device but on the fact of the government’s gaze.”12 
The legality of law enforcement’s use of location data remains 
ambiguous in the absence of clear direction from either the judiciary 
or the legislature.13 Further, the majority of the existing scholarship 
on the subject remains unworkably vague and hostile toward the 
government’s use of location data to aid in the investigation and 
prosecution of crime.14 This Comment proposes a standard for 
government access to location data that is not only practical, but also 
one that balances the legitimate interests of law enforcement and the 
privacy concerns of citizens. 
	
-20008444-281.html (“[P]olice are tapping into the locations of mobile phones thousands 
of times a year . . . .”). 
9 Going Dark: Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the Face of New Technologies: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism & Homeland Security of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2 (2011) [hereinafter Landau Hearing] (statement of Dr. 
Susan Landau), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/landau02172011.pdf. 
10 Id. 
11 See The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Government Perspectives on 
Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
112th Cong. 5 (2011) [hereinafter Baker Statement] (statement of James A. Baker, Assoc. 
Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov 
/pdf/11-4-6%20Baker%20Testimony.pdf. 
12 See United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., 
concurring). 
13 See Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep Up with 
Technological Change, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 239, 241 (2007) (noting that the 
law has fallen behind technology). 
14 See generally ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies and 
Services: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights & Civil Liberties 
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 77–78 (2010) (statement of U.S. 
Magistrate Judge Stephen Wm. Smith, Southern District of Texas), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-109_57082.pdf; Paul Ohm, The 
Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS L.J. 1309, 1312–13 (2012); 
Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. 
TECH. & POL’Y 281, 282 (2011). 
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Part I reviews the current state of technology and explains the 
various methods to obtain location data from smartphones. Part II 
provides an overview of Fourth Amendment doctrine as it pertains to 
location data. Part III discusses whether the government can utilize 
location data to aid in the investigation and prosecution of crimes 
while acting in accordance with existing Fourth Amendment rules. 
Part IV considers the policy concerns of privacy advocates as well 
as the governmental interest in public safety. Part V proposes a new 
standard that features a practical application of the Fourth 
Amendment while balancing the concern for individual liberty with 
the competing governmental interest to secure public safety. 
I 
OVERVIEW OF TECHNOLOGY 
Smartphone technology is only one development in the larger 
picture of technological advancements. In order to lay the 
groundwork to understand how technology has infused itself with 
American life, this section provides a broader review of modern 
technology. In the process, it will become clear how smartphones can 
potentially reveal intimate details of a citizen’s life. 
Paul Ohm, an associate professor who specializes in information 
privacy, describes four categories of technology that are responsible 
for shifting society into one that is more connected and less privacy-
oriented.15 First is the “one device,” which is the convergence of a 
person’s computing needs “into a single, portable, high-powered 
machine, equipped with an always-on, high-speed connection to the 
Internet, and outfitted with dozens of sensors, including multiple 
digital cameras . . . a microphone, a GPS chip, and a digital 
compass.”16 Ohm’s “one device” best describes the smartphone. 
There is mounting evidence that smartphones are becoming 
increasingly prevalent. In 2011, a Pew Internet study found that 
eighty-three percent of adults in the United States have a cell phone of 
some kind.17 Among cell phone owners, forty-two percent own a 
	
15 Ohm, supra note 14, at 1314. 
16 Id. 
17 Aaron Smith, Smartphone Adoption and Usage, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE 
PROJECT 2 (July 11, 2011), http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2011/PIP_Smart 
phones.pdf. 
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smartphone.18 Thus, thirty-five percent of the American adult 
population uses smartphones.19 
In addition to traditional phone calls and text messages, 
smartphones transmit data from third-party applications, including 
social media and e-mail programs. The use of data is becoming more 
common. Between 2007 and 2010, AT&T saw an 8000% increase in 
data traffic.20 Part of the transmitted data is location data. In fact, The 
Wall Street Journal noted in 2011 that 47 of the 101 most popular 
smartphone applications sent location information to third parties.21 
Given the increasing prevalence of smartphone ownership, the 
quantity and quality of data transmitted through these devices, and the 
fact that these devices are constantly at their owner’s side, third-party 
access to smartphone data has the potential to reveal intimate details 
about the user’s life.22 
The second technological advancement is “the cloud,” which 
facilitates “the migration of essential computing and storage facilities 
from local devices owned by users to distant servers owned by 
providers.”23 Data sent to these distant servers is remotely accessible 
from any computer, phone, or portable laptop with an Internet 
connection.24 
The third technological shift is the rapid development of social 
media, or what Ohm calls, “the social.”25 The social provides 
consumers with the ability to interact with a larger and more diverse 
network.26 The social also gives consumers a reason to adopt 
	
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Dan Meyer, AT&T Filing Provides Interesting Industry Data, RCR WIRELESS NEWS 
(Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.rcrwireless.com/article/20110425/carriers/110429949/at-t       
-filing-provides-interesting-industry-data. 
21 Jennifer Valentino-DeVries & Julia Angwin, Latest Treasure is Location Data, 
WALL ST. J. (May 9, 2011, 7:37 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487 
03730804576313522337383898.html. 
22 Zamani, supra note 5, at 170 (citing John Boudreau, Your Phone, Your Life: 
Applications For Your iPhone, Blackberry or Other Mobile Device Are Changing How 
You Navigate Your World, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 15, 2009, at 1A, available at 
2009 WLNR 5010619 (“Because their smart-phone is with them everywhere they go, 
people develop far closer attachments to the devices than to their home PCs or laptops.      
. . Nothing is as close to us all the time—not even your spouse or partner.”)). 
23 Ohm, supra note 14, at 1315. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 1316. 
26 See KEITH N. HAMPTON ET AL., SOCIAL ISOLATION AND NEW TECHNOLOGY: HOW 
THE INTERNET AND MOBILE PHONES IMPACT AMERICANS’ SOCIAL NETWORKS, PEW 
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technical advances like the one device and the cloud by building 
“upon the innate desire of humans to want to connect to others.”27 
The danger here is that, on social networks, “people reveal more of 
their thoughts and behavior, including things they might have before 
chosen to hide, and to more people than they ever have before.”28 It is 
even possible to draw conclusions from information that a user does 
not explicitly reveal. For example, students at MIT determined the 
sexual orientation of individuals on Facebook with shocking accuracy 
based on patterns of how they “friended” others.29 
The final advancement is “big data.” This refers to the use of data 
by companies to “squeeze more value from their existing data by 
making inferences.”30 For instance, Amazon.com prompts users to 
consider buying additional items based on what the user has recently 
purchased or searched for.31 In this fashion, people are really no 
longer anonymous, as it is possible to determine one’s identity by 
studying patterns in data.32 
These four technologies have the collective potential to reveal a 
comprehensive and intimate picture of one’s life. Because the one 
device is almost always on and often carried by the user, it provides 
continuous access to the cloud and the social. People relay various 
information about their lives on the social and perhaps store even 
more intimate knowledge on the cloud.33 Big data examines the other 
	
INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT 3–4 (Nov. 4, 2009), available at http://www 
.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2009/PIP_tech_and_social_isolation.pdf. 
27 Ohm, supra note 14, at 1316. 
28 Id. 
29 See Carter Jernigan & Behram F.T. Mistree, Gaydar: Facebook Friendships Expose 
Sexual Orientation, 14 FIRST MONDAY 10 (Oct. 5, 2009), available at http://journals.uic 
.edu/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2611/2302. But see Nadia Wynter, ‘Gaydar’ Project at 
MIT Attempts to Predict Sexuality Based on Facebook Profiles, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 
22, 2009, 1:17 PM), http://www.nydailynews .com/life-style/gaydar-project-mit-attempts-
predict-sexuality-based-facebook-profiles-article-1.404453 (questioning the validity of the 
MIT study). 
30 Ohm, supra note 14, at 1316. 
31 Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the 
Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 249 (2013). 
32 Id. 
33 See M. James Daley, Information Age Catch 22: The Challenge of Technology to 
Cross-Border Disclosure & Data Privacy, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 121, 123 (2011) 
(discussing social networking applications and their access to location data). 
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three technologies to produce data and paint a complete portrait of an 
individual’s life.34 
Taken together, these technologies arguably indicate the shift in 
cultural values of privacy and interconnectedness.35 This does not 
necessarily mean that privacy has no value in light of new 
technology.36 Indeed, as Professor Daniel Solove posits, if the focus 
is solely on the general public’s current expectation of privacy, “our 
conception of privacy would continually shrink given the increasing 
surveillance in the modern world.”37 While technology has facilitated 
the communication of intimate details to a much broader network of 
both personal contacts as well as service providers, this does not mean 
that there is no value in remaining free from undue government 
intrusion.38 
Central to this Comment is an analysis of how the government 
should access location data in light of new and increasingly prevalent 
technology. “Location data” refers to information that reveals the 
geographical position of a technological device and its user. It 
implicates all four technological advances. The one device generates 
location data, which in turn is often conveyed through functions of the 
social and the cloud. This information is potentially analyzed by big 
data to decipher patterns in human behavior.39 
	
34 See also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(“The Government can store [location data] and efficiently mine them for information 
years into the future.”). 
35 See The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Government Perspectives on 
Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
112th Cong. 4 (2011) [hereinafter Kerry Hearings] (testimony of Cameron F. Kerry, Gen. 
Counsel, U.S. Dept. of Commerce) (discussing social importance and economic value of 
recent digital communications, including location data in the formation of relation and 
political advocacy), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/11-4-6%20Kerry 
%20Testimony.pdf. 
36 But see Rushin, supra note 14, at 327 (arguing that our socially reasonable 
expectation to privacy is at its weakest in light of social media). 
37 Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1142 (2002). 
38 See Saby Ghoshray, Privacy Distortion Rationale for Reinterpreting the Third-Party 
Doctrine of the Fourth Amendment, 13 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 33, 82 (2011) (explaining 
that even with increase in social media, individuals still maintain the “right to be left 
alone”). 
39 See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 31, at 247 (listing ways that big data and location 
data can reveal patterns in food shortages, crime waves, and learning outcomes in 
developing country schools). 
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Many individuals carry electronic devices that reveal location data, 
primarily cell phones.40 In fact, the Federal Communications 
Commission has mandated that cell phone manufacturers make a 
minimum of ninety-five percent of their phones traceable.41 Recent 
data suggests that the government has utilized this function. For 
instance, in 2008, Sprint gathered the real-time location of its cell 
phone subscribers over eight million times at the request of law 
enforcement.42 To expedite the process, Sprint launched a self-service 
website where law enforcement could monitor the movements of any 
cell phone subscriber.43 
There are two ways that smartphones emit location data. First, 
many phones calculate extremely accurate location data using a GPS 
satellite receiver that is built directly into the cellular device.44 
Typically, the user must activate this function and consent to this 
information being collected.45 Smartphones with GPS capability will 
often have software that coaxes users into revealing their location to 
third-party services.46 Many users choose to share their real-time or 
historical location information online for social networking 
purposes.47 Other users convey location data for nonsocial purposes. 
For example, Google Maps taps into smartphones that are currently 
using its turn-by-turn GPS directions feature and subsequently 
collects the phones’ current location and speed.48 Google then uses 
	
40 See Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amendment 
Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614, 632 (2011). 
41 43 C.F.R. § 20.18(g); see also Laura E. Gomez-Martin, Smartphone Usage and the 
Need for Consumer Privacy Laws, 12 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 9 (2012). 
42 Alex Kozinski, Symposium Keynote: The Dead Past, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 117, 
119 (2012). 
43 Id. 
44 See ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies and Services: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, & Civil Liberties of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 5 (2010) [hereinafter Blaze Testimony] (testimony of 
Professor Matt Blaze), available at http://www.privacywonk.net/download/blaze-judiciary 
-20100624.pdf. 
45 Id. 
46 See Robertson, supra note 6; see also Scott Thurm & Yukari Iwatani Kane, Your 
Apps Are Watching You, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2010, 10:01 PM), http://online.wsj.com 
/article/SB10001424052748704694004576020083703574602.html. 
47 See Janice Y. Tsai et al., Location-Sharing Technologies: Privacy Risks and 
Controls, 6 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 119, 120–23 (2010) (reviewing various 
social media applications that share location data). 
48 See Tim Simonite, Android’s Rise Helps Google Grow Its Traffic Surveillance 
System, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/428732 
/androids-rise-helps-google-grow-its-traffic-surveillance-system/. 
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this information to update real-time traffic information.49 This 
transaction benefits the user by providing some type of service, which 
in this case, is detailed information on the quickest route to a given 
destination. 
The second method occurs through “network-based” location data. 
Similar to the first method, network-based location data provides 
information regarding a phone’s location but is less precise than 
GPS.50 Cell phones typically send out signals, called “pings,” to 
nearby cell towers in order to find the nearest tower with the greatest 
signal strength.51 This happens passively, meaning that it occurs 
without any action by the user.52 
Cell towers are maintained by service providers and are generally 
spread across geographic areas, providing voice and data services to 
phones. Service providers are constantly recording the approximate 
geographic area where a cell phone is located by determining which 
cell tower the phone is using.53 This data is used to gauge which cell 
towers experience the heaviest call volume and thus help service 
providers determine where to install new towers. 
While network-based data tends to be less precise than GPS, there 
are several methods to increase the accuracy of the location data. For 
instance, through a method called “triangulation,” service providers 
can locate a phone by measuring the relative angles and length of time 
that a ping from a mobile device takes to reach multiple cell towers.54 
This data is generally only available prospectively, usually because 
the user has dialed 911 or because a law enforcement agency has 
asked a carrier to collect the data.55 
The prevalence of cell phones and their ability to provide access to 
intimate details of an individual’s life pose murky waters for law 
	
49 Id. 
50 Courtney E. Walsh, Surveillance Technology and the Loss of Something a Lot Like 
Privacy: An Examination of the “Mosaic Theory” and the Limits of the Fourth 
Amendment, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 169, 239 (2012). 
51 William Curtiss, Triggering a Closer Review: Direct Acquisition of Cell Site 
Location Tracking Information and the Argument for Consistence Across Statutory 
Regimes, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 139, 144 (2011). 
52 Walsh, supra note 50, at 239. 
53 Blaze Testimony, supra note 44, at 7. 
54 Kevin McLaughlin, The Fourth Amendment and Cell Phone Location Tracking: 
Where Are We?, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 421, 426–27 (2007). 
55 Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward 
Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data That Congress 
Could Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 131 (2012). 
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enforcement and privacy activists. The next section will provide an 
overview of existing principles and case law that may shed light on 
how courts may decide crucial privacy questions in the future. 
II 
OVERVIEW OF LAW 
A. Underlying Principles of the Fourth Amendment 
The history of the Fourth Amendment reveals that the Framers of 
the Constitution were not necessarily concerned with privacy.56 In 
fact, “privacy” did not enter the vocabulary of the search and seizure 
analysis until the late 1800s, about one hundred years after the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted.57 Over time, privacy became a court-
recognized aspect of Fourth Amendment law, although not an aspect 
that is textually mandated by the Fourth Amendment.58 In this 
context, privacy acts more as a proxy for what the Framers were truly 
concerned about: the relationship between a government and its 
people. 
While drafting the Fourth Amendment, fresh in the Framers’ minds 
was the relationship between the people and the crown, an affair that 
was marked by insecurity and imbalanced power.59 It is well 
documented that the Fourth Amendment was intended to enhance 
individual liberty through the restraint of government power.60 Take, 
for instance, the general warrant, which authorized an official of the 
crown to apprehend anyone they suspected of a crime or to search any 
place they suspected might contain evidence of a crime. The Framers 
considered the use of general warrants intolerable.61 They took 
	
56 See James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy’s Sake: Toward an Expanded 
Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 668 (1985) 
(arguing that the Framers were not concerned about “mere secrecy” as much as they were 
constrained search and seizure). 
57 See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 
HARV. L. REV. 193, 195–96 (1890). 
58 Walsh, supra note 50, at 175. 
59 See Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment 
Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 296–97 (1993). 
60 Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, 
and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 618–19 (1996); see also 
Cloud, supra note 59, at 295 (“The [F]ourth [A]mendment exists for the very purpose of 
enhancing individual liberty by constraining government power.”). 
61 See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 29 (2012). 
LIN (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2013  11:54 AM 
204 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92, 193 
particular offense to having the crown’s menial servants violate the 
privacy of the home.62 It was against this backdrop that the Framers 
drafted the Fourth Amendment. Professor Stephen Schulhofer noted 
three points that were emphasized in the eighteenth-century period: 
judicial authorization, specificity, and the control of executive 
discretion.63 
For a warrant to be valid, it must be authorized by a judicial 
officer.64 The Framers further believed that narrowly and specifically 
drawn warrants were a “vital means of protection.”65 Finally, the 
Framers were concerned with curtailing the discretion of the official 
executing the search warrant.66 Chief Judge Hale explained that one 
of the prime evils of the general warrant is the fact that it “makes the 
party [executing it] to be in effect the judge.”67 Judge Blackstone 
shared similar sentiments, explaining that “a general warrant . . . is 
illegal and void for its uncertainty . . . ; for it . . . ought not be left to 
the officer, to judge of the grounds of suspicion.”68 
Thus, the warrant process became a mechanism for assuring the 
King’s subjects that royal powers were being exercised under judicial 
oversight and within the bounds of the law. But this was just part of a 
larger movement by the Framers to promote a relationship with the 
government that safeguarded the peoples’ right to be secure.69 The 
aim of the Fourth Amendment is, as Professor Schulhofer describes, 
the “preservation of a vibrant society that respects the freedom and 
autonomy of each individual.”70 
The Framers could not have possibly predicted the sweeping 
technological changes to come, such as the advent of the Internet or 
global positioning systems. Nor could they have envisioned the 
modern-day organized system of law enforcement, a far cry from the 
	
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 23. 
64 Id. at 31. 
65 Id. at 33 (citing Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 
MICH. L. REV. 547, 619–68 (1999)). 
66 Id. at 34. 
67 Id. at 35 (citing 2 SIR MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 150 
(P.R. Glazebrook gen. ed., London Professional Books Ltd. 1971) (1736)). 
68 Id. at 36 n.25 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 288 (facsimile ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1979) (1769)). 
69 Id. at 39. 
70 Id. at 142. 
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eighteenth-century constable.71 Surely, the Framers intended the 
Constitution to be an assertion of fundamental values rather than an 
outdated treatise of criminal procedure. 
As times change, courts are faced with the challenge of applying 
eighteenth-century principles to twenty-first-century problems. In 
order to preserve the foundational standards envisioned by the 
Framers, courts must understand the distinction between eighteenth-
century rules and eighteenth-century principles. In Justice Brandeis’s 
words: 
[T]ime works changes . . . and general warrants are but puny 
instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wire-
tapping . . . . The makers of our Constitution . . . knew that only a 
part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in 
material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, 
their thoughts, their emotion and their sensations. They conferred, 
as against the government, the right to be let alone.72 
In order to effectuate Justice Brandeis’s vision, policy makers must 
respect the intentions of the Framers to create a relationship between 
a government and its people that safeguards personal development 
and civic engagement. 
B. Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
Congress has remained silent on law enforcement’s ability to 
obtain location data. In fact, the one major piece of legislation 
impacting digital communications, the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (ECPA), was enacted in 1986 and is hopelessly 
outdated.73 Even though the ECPA is the primary statute governing 
law enforcement access to wire, oral, and electronic communications, 
it does not provide guidance on how law enforcement should use 
location data and does not even contain the word “location.” Four 
	
71 The recent phenomenon of militarizing local law enforcement, such as the 
procurement of armored personnel carriers, helicopters, Humvees, and even military-grade 
weapons, would be unknown to the Framers. See Radley Balko, Rise of the Warrior Cop: 
How Did America’s Police Become A Military Force on the Streets?, 99 JULY. A.B.A. J. 
44, 46 (2013). 
72 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473, 476, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
73 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
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bills that address the problem of undue intrusion of location data were 
recently introduced, but these bills all failed to pass.74 
The Department of Justice has interpreted the ECPA to allow the 
collection of location data from cell phones through several methods, 
including through court orders.75 However, the statute does not 
specify a standard by which the government must meet to obtain a 
court order.76 
The lack of clear direction from the legislature has resulted in 
inconsistent standards at the district court level. Some courts apply a 
heightened standard, requiring law enforcement officials to provide 
probable cause to obtain prospective, real-time location data to track 
suspects in criminal investigations.77 Some courts exercise a lower 
standard, requiring only a showing of specific and articulable facts.78 
C. Case Law 
Few commentators are particularly fond of Fourth Amendment 
case law.79 Over time, the Court has eroded Fourth Amendment 
protections as it pertains to electronic communications. This section 
begins by explaining how the Court arrived at the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test. It then discusses two of the most widely 
criticized doctrines in Fourth Amendment case law: the plain view 
	
74 Geolocation Privacy and Surveillance Act of 2011, S. 1212, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011); 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, S. 1011, 112th Cong. 
§ 5 (2011); Location Privacy Protection Act of 2011, S. 1223, 112th Cong. (2011); 
Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. (2011). 
75 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Government Perspectives on 
Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
112th Cong. § 5, at 8 (2011) [hereinafter Baker Testimony] (testimony of James A. Baker, 
Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys 
/pkg/CHRG-112shrg70856/pdf/CHRG-112shrg70856.pdf. 
76 Id. 
77 See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of 
Prospective Cell Site Info., 407 F. Supp. 2d 134, 135 (D.D.C. 2006); In re Application of 
the U.S. for Orders Authorizing the Installation & Use of Pen Registers & Caller 
Identification Devices on Tel. Nos. [sealed] and [sealed], 416 F. Supp. 2d 390, 391 (D. 
Md. 2006). 
78 See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 315–19 (3d. Cir. 2010); 
In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen 
Register with Caller Identification Device & Cell Site Location Authority on a Certain 
Cellular Telephone, 415 F. Supp. 2d 663, 666 (S.D. W. Va. 2006). 
79 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 480 (2011) (commenting on search and seizure law as a 
“theoretical embarrassment”). 
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doctrine and the third party doctrine. It concludes by discussing the 
significance of two recent cases that impacted the landscape of 
government access to location data. 
1. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test 
Olmstead v. United States kicked off the modern Fourth 
Amendment line of cases.80 In Olmstead, the defendants were 
convicted of violating Prohibition by conspiring to import, possess, 
and sell alcohol.81 Federal agents wiretapped the defendant’s phone 
lines from outside the house.82 Because there was no physical 
trespass, that is, no “actual physical invasion” of the defendant’s 
property, the Supreme Court held that there was no Fourth 
Amendment violation.83 According to Chief Justice William Howard 
Taft, the Fourth Amendment only extended protection to “material 
things.”84 
Justice Brandeis responded with his famous dissent, 
acknowledging that as time, society, and technology changes, so too 
must Fourth Amendment doctrine. He believed in a broader 
application of the Fourth Amendment, where “every unjustifiable 
intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the individual, 
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.”85 
Decades later, the court adopted Justice Brandeis’s approach and 
overturned Olmstead in the landmark case Katz v. United States.86 In 
Katz, federal agents planted an electronic listening device against the 
outside of a phone booth, in which the defendant subsequently placed 
an incriminating phone call.87 At no point did the agents physically 
enter the booth.88 However, the Court recognized that Fourth 
Amendment protection did not “turn upon the presence or absence of 
a physical intrusion,” and the fact that the agents did not penetrate the 
	
80 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
81 Id. at 455. 
82 Id. at 456–57. 
83 Id. at 466. 
84 Id. at 464. 
85 Id. at 478–79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
86 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
87 Id. at 348. 
88 Id. 
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walls of the booth had no constitutional significance.89 Using what 
became one of the most cited phrases in Fourth Amendment case law 
and scholarship, Justice Stewart wrote, “the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places.”90 
Concurring Justice Harlan’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
test later became the prevailing test for Fourth Amendment search and 
seizure.91 The test has two prongs. First, the defendant must have a 
subjective expectation of privacy.92 Second, that expectation must be 
an objective one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.93 
Katz ushered in a new era of Fourth Amendment doctrine. Prior to 
Katz, the Court’s analysis turned on the existence of a trespass upon a 
constitutionally protected area. Subsequently, the Court abandoned 
the requirement of a physical trespass and focused instead on the 
protection of persons—not property. Some have posited that the Court 
abandoned the trespass requirement due to social developments.94 
That is, changes in everyday life, such as the indispensable function 
of public telephones in private communications, made the 
surveillance in Katz unconstitutional.95 Despite this, the Court has 
weakened Fourth Amendment protections over time, especially 
through the plain view and third party doctrines. 
2. Plain View Doctrine 
Under Katz, the basic premise of the plain view doctrine is that a 
person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy to anything 
that he knowingly exposes to the public.96 The Supreme Court has 
applied this doctrine to location data in two key cases, known as the 
Beeper Cases. 
The first Beeper Case is United States v. Knotts.97 There, with the 
consent of a chemical company, police placed a beeper in a five-
gallon drum of chloroform that was subsequently purchased by the 
defendant.98 Using both visual surveillance and the signal emitted 
	
89 Id. at 353. 
90 Id. at 351. 
91 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). 
92 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
93 Id. 
94 SCHULHOFER, supra note 61, at 119. 
95 Id. 
96 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
97 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
98 Id. at 278. 
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from the beeper, law enforcement tracked the defendant’s movements 
on public roads to an illicit drug lab.99 The Supreme Court held that 
this type of surveillance did not violate the Fourth Amendment 
because the government’s conduct amounted to following a vehicle 
on public roads and a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in public movements from one place to another.100 
Conversely, in United States v. Karo, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the government’s use of a beeper to obtain location 
data was unconstitutional because the beeper revealed information 
about the interior of the home.101 Unlike Knotts, the information 
gathered here could not be obtained by tracking the defendant’s 
movements on public roads and was not otherwise available to the 
public. Thus, the interior of the home fell within the protection 
afforded by the Fourth Amendment. 
In the Beeper Cases, the Court reaffirmed the plain view doctrine 
in the context of location data and government surveillance. However, 
the Court’s approach does not make clear whether there is a limit to 
governmental surveillance of citizens, even on public thoroughfares. 
Rather, the Court specifically left the unanswered question of whether 
law enforcement can perform twenty-four hour surveillance of any 
citizen without judicial knowledge or supervision.102 
3. Third-Party Doctrine 
Under the third-party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment does not 
protect information that an individual reveals to a third party, even if 
the information was revealed on the assumption that the confidence 
placed in the third party will not be betrayed.103 In the words of the 
Ninth Circuit’s Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, “[n]ot everything an 
individual wishes to keep private is legally protected as such.”104 
Courts have applied the third-party doctrine to information 
regarding transactions made through financial institutions,105 numbers 
dialed on phones,106 and even a list of every person an accused has 
	
99 Id. at 278–79. 
100 Id. at 281. 
101 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984). 
102 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283–84. 
103 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
104 Kozinski, supra note 42, at 119. 
105 Id. 
106 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979). 
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emailed.107 Consistent in the reasoning is a distinction between the 
content of the communication and the information that was 
“voluntarily” conveyed to service providers, the latter being 
information that is presumably void of any actual expectation of 
privacy. For instance, while the contents of a telephone conversation 
are not revealed to the phone company, all “telephone users realize 
that they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone company, 
since it is through telephone company switching equipment that their 
calls are completed.”108 
The slow erosions of Fourth Amendment protections by the third-
party doctrine make it impossible to protect informational privacy in 
the modern world. According to the Court, the above forms of 
information are not truly private because citizens voluntarily choose 
to expose such information, thereby assuming the risk that it may 
become exposed to law enforcement.109 Yet, under such logic, Katz 
should have come out differently. There, Katz chose to place a call 
from a public location. Thus, Katz assumed the risk that federal 
agents could listen in on the conversation. 
The Court in Katz held that the warrantless surveillance violated 
the Fourth Amendment because of the recognition that public 
telephones became an indispensible function of everyday life. Thus, 
even though the surveillance did not involve physical trespass, it still 
violated Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy because to say 
otherwise would be to “ignore the vital role that the public telephone 
has come to play in private communication.”110 
The Court has not determined how the plain view doctrine and the 
third-party doctrine applies to location data emitted from 
smartphones. However, in 2012, the Court handed down an opinion in 
United States v. Jones that fundamentally altered the landscape of 
electronic surveillance and provided a glimpse into how various 
members of the Court may rule in the future.111 
	
107 See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509–10 (9th Cir. 2008). 
108 Smith, 422 U.S. at 742. 
109 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“The depositor takes 
the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that 
person to the Government.”). 
110 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). 
111 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
LIN (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2013  11:54 AM 
2013] Siri, Can You Keep a Secret? A Balanced Approach to 211 
Fourth Amendment Principles and Location Data 
4. The Jones Decision 
In United States v. Jones, federal agents placed a GPS tracker to 
the bottom of a vehicle belonging to the defendant’s wife.112 Over a 
period of twenty-eight days, the government monitored the vehicle’s 
movements using the GPS tracker.113 A unanimous Court held that 
the secret placement of the GPS tracker on the vehicle violated the 
Fourth Amendment, but came to this conclusion on varying 
grounds.114 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia grounded his opinion on the 
narrowest grounds possible, focusing on the physical intrusion of a 
protected area for the purpose of obtaining information.115 Basing his 
decision on the physical trespass that occurred, Justice Scalia wrote 
that “the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular 
concern for government trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, 
papers, and effects’) it enumerates.”116 By attaching the GPS tracker 
to the vehicle, the officers encroached on a protected area, thus 
violating the defendant’s Fourth Amendment protections.117 
Justice Scalia relied upon an originalist reading of the Fourth 
Amendment, acknowledging the “18th-century guarantee against 
unreasonable searches, which we believe must provide at a minimum 
the degree of protection it afforded when it was adopted.”118 This 
reading of the Constitution boils down to the notion that a search 
violates the Fourth Amendment if it involves a physical trespass onto 
the defendant’s property. Yet, this appears to be the logic that was 
overruled in Olmstead. Justice Scalia reconciles this discrepancy by 
recognizing that Katz did not replace the trespass test but rather 
augmented it.119 He does acknowledge that government tracking 
through electronic means without actual physical trespass may be “an 
unconstitutional invasion of privacy,” but he explicitly refused to 
address this issue.120 
	
112 Id. at 948. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 949. 
115 Id. at 950. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 952. 
118 Id. at 953. 
119 Id. at 950. 
120 Id. at 954 (“[T]he present case does not require us to answer that question. . . . We 
may have to grapple with these ‘vexing problems’ in some future case where a classic 
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Justice Scalia’s emphasis on trespass is troubling given the strong 
body of Supreme Court decisions that examine trespass in the context 
of the Fourth Amendment. For example, in Oliver v. United States, 
the Court held that the search of an open field did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment, even though law enforcement committed a 
trespass upon the defendant’s property.121 There, the Court reasoned 
that “even a property interest in premises may not be sufficient to 
establish a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to particular 
items located on the premises or activity conducted thereon.”122 Thus, 
the rule placed forth in Jones seems contrary to existing case law and 
creates greater ambiguity as to how the Fourth Amendment applies to 
government surveillance through location data when conduct does not 
involve trespass.123 
In her concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor agreed that Katz was 
meant to augment the trespass test, not replace it.124 But she 
recognized that the trespass doctrine ultimately provides little 
guidance on cases where electronic or other novel modes of 
surveillance are successfully implemented without physical invasion 
of property.125 
Importantly, Justice Sotomayor acknowledged that long-term 
monitoring of location interferes with a citizen’s expectations of 
privacy.126 Location data reveals details about one’s “familial, 
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”127 
Awareness of government surveillance in this regard “chills 
associational and expressive freedoms. . . . The net result is that GPS 
monitoring . . . may ‘alter the relationship between citizen and 
government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.’”128 
	
trespassory search is not involved and resort must be had to Katz analysis; but there is no 
reason for rushing forward to resolve them here.”). 
121 466 U.S. 170, 183 (1984). 
122 Id. 
123 Hon. Kevin Emas & Tamara Pallas, United States v. Jones: Does Katz Still Have 
Nine Lives?, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 116, 149 (2012). 
124 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 956 (citing United States v. Cuevas Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(Flaum, J., concurring)). 
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In this context, Justice Sotomayor questions the third-party 
doctrine.129 She notes that the all-or-nothing approach of the third-
party doctrine is “ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a 
great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the 
course of carrying out mundane tasks.”130 She briefly reasserts a 
“degrees of privacy” approach, first made by Justice Thurgood 
Marshall in a decades-old dissent from Smith v. Maryland.131 The 
principle is that people maintain varying degrees of privacy in 
voluntarily disclosed information to third parties, and in our age, we 
cannot avoid disclosing information to certain sources such as banks 
or phone companies.132 This approach has support in Katz, where it 
was understood that “what [a person] seeks to preserve as private, 
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.”133 
Justice Alito’s concurrence criticizes the majority’s narrow trespass 
approach: “The Court’s reasoning largely disregards what is really 
important (the use of a GPS for the purpose of long-term tracking) 
and instead attaches great significance to something that most would 
view as relatively minor (attaching to the bottom of a car a small, 
light object that does not interfere in any way with the car’s 
operation).”134 The majority thus leaves unanswered a solution to the 
“vexing problems” where surveillance can be carried out through 
electronic means that do not involve physical contact.135 
Justice Alito would institute Katz as the exclusive test for whether 
a Fourth Amendment search has occurred.136 He modifies the Katz 
test to address non-physical, electronic surveillance, concluding that 
police conduct is a search when it “involve[s] a degree of intrusion 
	
129 Id. at 957 (“More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that 
an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed 
to third parties.”). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(“Those who disclose certain facts to a bank or phone company for a limited business 
purpose need not assume that this information will be released to other persons for other 
purposes.”)). 
133 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 
(1967)). 
134 Id. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring). 
135 Id. at 962. 
136 Id. at 959–60. 
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that a reasonable person would not have anticipated” in that 
“particular case.”137 
One factor that Justice Alito uses to assess the “degree of 
intrusion” is the length of the surveillance.138 He notes that four-week 
long tracking certainly violates society’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy while short-term tracking does not.139 This is because an 
individual does not necessarily have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a single trip made on public thoroughfares. But that 
individual may find it unreasonable to be followed over the course of 
a long period of time, even if the surveillance took place on public 
roads. Unfortunately, Justice Alito fails to explain at what point the 
line would be crossed, and even recognizes that long-term tracking 
may be reasonable if the crime is severe enough.140 
Even with its recognized ambiguities, Justice Alito’s four-vote 
approach may become the majority, as Justice Sotomayor has given 
weight to his approach in her own concurrence.141 What is 
noteworthy about Justice Alito’s concurrence is that it shifts the 
question from what society allows an individual to demand and asks 
what a reasonable person would anticipate that the police would 
do.142 
Many commentators have criticized the Court for failing to 
determine the legality of invasive, long-term invasions of privacy 
created by government surveillance.143 Many have also hypothesized 
about the effect of the Jones decision on GPS tracking.144 Further, the 
	
137 Id. at 964. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. The majority also criticizes Justice Alito on this point, noting that: 
[I]t remains unexplained why a 4-week investigation is ‘surely’ too long and why 
a drug-trafficking conspiracy involving substantial amounts of cash and narcotics 
is not an “extraordinary offens[e]” which may permit longer observation. What 
of a 2-day monitoring of a suspected purveyor of stolen electronics? Or of a 6-
month monitoring of a suspected terrorist? 
Id. at 954 (citation omitted). 
141 Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
142 Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
143 See Dahlia Lithwick, Alito vs. Scalia, SLATE (Jan. 23, 2012, 6:38 PM), http://www 
.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/01/u_s_v_jones_supreme_court 
_justices_alito_and_scalia_brawl_over_technology_and_privacy_.html (noting that Justice 
Sotomayor “seems best to understand that [intrusive government surveillance] is the real 
problem the court [sic] should be focused on, even though she refuses to address it 
today”). 
144 See, e.g., Lauren Millcarek, Eighteenth Century Law, Twenty-First Century 
Problems: Jones, GPS Tracking, and the Future of Privacy, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1101, 1110 
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decision has left many law enforcement agencies grappling with the 
aftermath of Jones.145 The next section explores United States v. 
Skinner, a recent Sixth Circuit case that looks at electronic 
surveillance through cell phones in light of the Jones decision. 
5. United States v. Skinner: A Recent Approach to Location Data 
Surveillance 
In May 2006, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
obtained a court order authorizing agents to “ping” a cell phone 
carried by Melvin Skinner, a suspect in an ongoing investigation.146 
Agents tracked Skinner’s location via his cell phone as he traveled 
across state lines, eventually locating him at a truck stop where he 
was found with over 1100 pounds of marijuana.147 
In denying Skinner’s motion to suppress, the Sixth Circuit held that 
the DEA agents did not require probable cause to ping Skinner’s cell 
phone and obtain his precise location because there was not a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in data given off by Skinner’s cell 
phone.148 At the very outset, the court declared that “[w]hen criminals 
use modern technological devices to carry out criminal acts and to 
reduce the possibility of detection, they can hardly complain when 
police take advantage of the inherent characteristics of those very 
devices to catch them.”149 
The court focused particularly on two aspects: the voluntary 
procurement of the cell phone by Skinner and the use of public 
thoroughfares.150 The Fourth Amendment was not violated because 
there could not be a reasonable expectation of privacy in data sent 
	
(2012) (“Under Jones, the police can still install trackers into your electronics before you 
come into possession of them and track you theoretically ad infinitum, without 
consequences.”). 
145 See, e.g., Tom Goldstein, Why Jones Is Still Less of a Pro-Privacy Decision Than 
Most Thought (Conclusion Slightly Revised Jan. 31), SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 30, 2012, 10:53 
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=138066; Carrie Johnson, FBI Still Struggling with 
Supreme Court’s GPS Ruling, NPR, Mar. 21, 2012, http://www.npr.org/2012/03/21 
/149011887/fbi-still-struggling-with-supreme-courts-gps-ruling; Lior J. Strahilevitz, Can 
the Police Keep up with Jones?, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 27, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune 
.com/2012-01-27/opinion/ct-perspec-0127-privacy-20120127_1_facial-recognition-gps     
-device-cameras (describing possibly constitutionally suspect police technologies). 
146 United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 775 (6th Cir. 2012). 
147 Id. at 774. 
148 Id. at 775. 
149 Id. at 774. 
150 Id. at 781. 
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from a voluntarily procured cell phone.151 Further, the court 
determined that there was no inherent constitutional difference 
between physically trailing a defendant and tracking via voluntarily 
procured technology.152 This analysis places emphasis on what the 
defendant is disclosing to the public rather than what is known by the 
police.153 As a public policy matter, this approach allows law 
enforcement tactics to evolve with technological advancements and 
promotes more efficient means of discovering a suspect’s 
movements.154 
The majority, citing Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones, noted 
that prolonged comprehensive tracking might be unreasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment.155 However, because the relatively short-
term monitoring here (three days) did not come close to the tracking 
in Jones (twenty-eight days), the court declined to elaborate on this 
standard.156 
In applying the two-pronged Katz analysis, the dissent notes that 
society is prepared to recognize a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
location data given off by cell phones.157 Influenced by the 
prevalence of cell phones in everyday life, the dissent recognizes that 
phones are “not contraband and . . . possession of the phone [is] not 
illegal.”158 Just because a phone is used in a crime doesn’t mean there 
is “no expectation of privacy in the data emitted from the phone.”159 
Skinner poses several challenges to both law enforcement and 
privacy activists. First, while the Sixth Circuit recognizes that overly 
comprehensive tracking of location data emitted from cell phones 
may violate the Fourth Amendment, it leaves unanswered questions 
regarding what level of surveillance constitutes overly comprehensive 
tracking. Further, the Sixth Circuit emphasized that the monitoring 
took place while Skinner was on public thoroughfares and relied upon 
the rationale of the beeper cases. However, unlike vehicles, cell 
phones are actually taken within protected spaces, such as the 
	
151 Id. at 777. 
152 Id. at 778. 
153 Id. at 779. 
154 Id. at 778. 
155 Id. at 780. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 786 (Donald, J., dissenting). 
158 Id. at 785. 
159 Id. 
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home.160 It is unclear how law enforcement will distinguish when an 
individual is on public roadways as opposed to protected spaces.161 
Additionally, cell phone monitoring provides much more 
comprehensive information than placing a tracking device on a 
vehicle.162 
The Sixth Circuit also relied on the fact that Skinner voluntarily 
procured his phone, and thus voluntarily conveyed his location. 
However, several courts have questioned the premise that consumers 
are voluntarily conveying information by simply using their 
phones.163 
Taken to the extreme, if a citizen wants to avoid government 
surveillance of location through cell phones, the option left by the 
Sixth Circuit is to withdraw from the use of cell phones completely. 
This could not have been the price that the Framers expected us to 
pay for retaining any claim of privacy. The Fourth Amendment was 
established to define the type of relationship a government should 
have with its people in order to promote civic life, not to stifle it. 
In summary, despite the existence of a large body of law regarding 
government surveillance of citizens, a review of the case law reveals 
several ambiguities. First, the Court has created tension between the 
trespass doctrine and the reasonable expectation of privacy test, even 
though Katz arguably rejected the trespass doctrine in the context of 
Fourth Amendment searches.164 
Second, the Court did not address whether law enforcement can 
conduct twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen without judicial 
oversight. Jones missed an opportunity to provide clarity in this realm 
and failed to recognize the various ways that long-term tracking could 
be instituted without the use of trespass. The following section will 
	
160 See Brian Davis, Prying Eyes: How Government Access to Third-Party Tracking 
Data May be Impacted by United States v. Jones, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 843, 865–66 
(2012) (noting how cell phone users’ movements are highly unpredictable and can enter 
into constitutionally protected areas unexpectedly). 
161 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (“In the home . . . all details are 
intimate details.”). 
162 See Marc McAllister, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: The 
Misapplication of Analogical Reasoning, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 475, 492 (2012) (tracking 
movements through cell phones is more invasive than tracking one’s movements during 
single journeys and more difficult to replicate through traditional forms of surveillance). 
163 See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317–18 (3d Cir. 2010). 
164 See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 748–49 (1971) (recognizing that 
Katz overruled Olmstead). 
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attempt to adress this issue in light of existing precedent as well as the 
concurring opinions of five justices of the Supreme Court. 
III 
ANALYSIS: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GOVERNMENTAL ACCESS 
TO LOCATION DATA 
Can the government utilize smartphone technology to aid in the 
investigation and prosecution of crime without violating 
constitutional guarantees of privacy? The oversimplified answer is 
yes. As demonstrated in Skinner, under the plain view doctrine, there 
is no reasonable expectation of privacy to location data so long as 
movements are made on public thoroughfares.165 Further, under the 
third-party analysis, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy to 
location data conveyed to service providers. However, this analysis 
may change soon, as several members of the Court have expressed 
concerns over these doctrines. 
A. Plain View Analysis 
Under the plain view doctrine, an individual does not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy to information that is exposed in 
plain view and visible to the public.166 The Skinner opinion serves as 
an example of the plain view doctrine applied to location data. 
Relying on the Supreme Court’s rationale in Knotts, the Sixth Circuit 
determined that the Fourth Amendment does not protect location data 
emitted from a cell phone while driving on public streets because 
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy to travel on public 
thoroughfares.167 The government conduct was compared to what 
occurred in Knotts, where police could have obtained the data by 
following the defendant’s vehicle on public roads.168 
Both the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court have recognized the 
value in police efficiency. In Knotts, the Court refused to “equate[] 
police efficiency with unconstitutionality.”169 In Skinner, the Sixth 
Circuit posits that “[l]aw enforcement tactics must be allowed to 
advance with technological changes, in order to prevent criminals 
	
165 United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 778 (6th Cir. 2012). 
166 See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986). 
167 Skinner, 690 F.3d at 778. 
168 Id. 
169 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983). 
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from circumventing the justice system.”170 In this context, the 
warrantless use of location data fits comfortably within constitutional 
doctrine, especially since a person does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy to their movements in public and obtaining this 
information does not provide police with any information that could 
not be gathered from mere observation.171 
Some scholars argue for a reassessment of the presumption that 
individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their public 
movements.172 There is no doubt that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a single trip made in public. However, it is 
less clear whether it is reasonable to expect the totality of one’s 
movements to be monitored, even when made in public.173 
Justice Sotomayor expressed concern over long-term monitoring in 
Jones.174 Specifically, because location data reveals details about 
one’s “familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations,” awareness of government surveillance may “chill[] 
associational and expressive freedoms. . . . The net result is that GPS 
monitoring . . . may ‘alter the relationship between citizen and 
government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.’”175 
B. Third Party Analysis 
Under the third-party doctrine, law enforcement can access 
location data from service providers. As mentioned above, modern 
cell phones routinely transmit signals to the nearest tower to ensure 
the strongest possible signal.176 Service providers then create internal 
records of this data in order to determine where to erect additional cell 
	
170 Skinner, 690 F.3d at 778. 
171 See also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S 27, 34 (2001) (discussing the reason why 
technology that provides extrasensory information violated objective reasonable 
expectations of privacy). 
172 See Rushin, supra note 14, at 327. 
173 Courtney Burten, Unwarranted! Privacy in a Technological Age: The Fourth 
Amendment Difficulty in Protecting Against Warrantless GPS Tracking and the 
Substantive Due Process and First Amendment Boost, 21 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 359, 369 
(2012) (arguing that it is not reasonable to expect the totality of one’s movements to be 
monitored, even on public thoroughfares). 
174 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
175 Id. at 956 (citing United States v. Cuevas Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(Flaum, J., concurring)). 
176 William Curtiss, Triggering a Closer Review: Direct Acquisition of Cell Site 
Location Tracking Information and the Argument for Consistence Across Statutory 
Regimes, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 139, 144 (2011). 
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towers.177 Much like how we lose our reasonable expectation of 
privacy to transactions with banks, we lose any Fourth Amendment 
protection of data once it is transmitted to third parties, such as cell 
phone service providers.178 
There have been many criticisms of this approach.179 Some 
scholars contend that privacy has never been equated with mere 
secrecy. For instance, Professor Schulhofer believes that privacy is 
“the right to control knowledge about our personal lives, [and] the 
right to decide how much information gets revealed to whom and for 
which purposes.”180 Professor Schulholfer further contends that, 
“[r]elationships give meaning to our lives and define a large part of 
who we are. To insist that information is private only when it remains 
completely secret is preposterous.”181 While Professor Schulholfer’s 
interpretation of privacy would severely impede the government’s 
ability to conduct vital law enforcement functions, it is not without 
merit. 
Even Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Jones recognizes 
that, in the digital age, “people reveal a great deal of information 
about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out 
mundane tasks.”182 Some predict that other members of the Supreme 
Court likely believe that the mere existence of a digital intermediary 
does not remove all reasonable expectation of privacy.183 Because 
modern communications often rely on a third-party service provider, 
the third-party doctrine becomes unduly restrictive.184 Without using 
these third-party services, individuals living in today’s technological 
world will not be able to communicate with his or her community and 
will not be able to participate fully in society.185 These implications 
	
177 See United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 399 (D. Md. 2012). 
178 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971). 
179 See Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Fourth Amendment Protection for Shared 
Privacy Rights in Stored Transactional Data, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 211, 265 (2006) (urging 
abandonment of third-party doctrine); Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications 
Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, 41 (urging restricting third-party to its original 
context in bank records and telephone numbers, but preventing the spread to network 
services); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The New World of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 17 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 531, 546 (2006) (recognizing the rationale for third-party doctrine 
is “exceptionally strained”). 
180 SCHULHOFER, supra note 61, at 130. 
181 Id. 
182 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
183 See Strandburg, supra note 40, at 618. 
184 See Ghoshray, supra note 38, at 65. 
185 Id. at 73–74. 
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raise the question of whether such a blind adoption of the third-party 
doctrine should be permissible.186 After all, the Court has sought to 
protect privacy, not solitude. 
C. Criticisms of the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Analysis 
Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test has recently come 
under scrutiny. Some of the criticism is directed at the ambiguity that 
arose from Jones. Recognizing the significance of modern wireless 
devices and the ability of service providers to track and record the 
location of users, Justice Alito expressed concern that real time 
surveillance on a constant basis for a prolonged duration is 
unreasonable under the Katz analysis.187 But at what point does long-
term monitoring become unreasonable under the reasonable 
expectation of privacy analysis? Law enforcement typically requests 
data from providers for periods of up to sixty days,188 more than 
twice as long as the twenty-eight day surveillance in Jones. 
Some scholars believe that the reasonable expectation of privacy 
analysis is inherently flawed. For example, Associate Professor Marc 
McAllister believes that this analysis denies a meaningful approach to 
the Fourth Amendment because stare decisis mandates the application 
of reasoning from an earlier technological era to modern cases.189 
Further, the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis is 
unpredictable. As Justice Alito noted in his Jones concurrence, judges 
are apt to confuse their own expectations of privacy with those of the 
hypothetical reasonable person to which the Katz test looks at.190 
Indeed, the Court has noted in prior instances that there is “no 
talisman that determines in all cases those privacy expectations that 
society is prepared to accept as reasonable.”191 The Katz analysis is 
further flawed because it assumes that a reasonable person has a 
	
186 See Joshua A. Engel, Doctrinal Collapse: Smart Phones Cause Courts to 
Reconsider Fourth Amendment Searches of Electronic Devices, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 233, 
238 (2010) (discussing how SCOTUS has been reluctant to “determine the exact contours 
of the reasonable expectation of privacy in the face of new technology”). 
187 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 960–63 (Alito, J., concurring). 
188 See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 
827, 829 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 
189 McAllister, supra note 162, at 483–84. 
190 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 
83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
191 See, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987). 
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“well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations.”192 But as 
technology changes, the expectations of the hypothetical reasonable 
person change as well.193 
In sum, under current law, the government can access cell phone 
technology to aid in the investigation and prosecution of crime 
without violating the Fourth Amendment. However, the underlying 
doctrine on which this conclusion rests has been sharply criticized by 
scholars and judges. Given this, the next question is not whether the 
government can utilize smartphone technology to aid in criminal 
investigation and prosecution, but whether the government should be 
able to and to what degree? 
IV 
POLICY 
A. Society’s Interest in Privacy 
What if society is moving away from a culture that fundamentally 
values privacy? In this context, does the Fourth Amendment become 
antiquated in the same way that the fear of state-mandated quartering 
of soldiers became antiquated?194 Smartphones allow people to 
maintain a constant connection with the social world. Consumers 
share a wealth of personal information with private entities, often to 
the benefit of both the user and entity. Indeed, Professor Paul Ohm 
believes that “[s]ystems of private surveillance are not simply 
becoming more powerful and widespread, but they are becoming all-
knowing and ubiquitous,” resulting in a “full evisceration” of the 
Fourth Amendment.195 Thus, Professor Ohm asks: In a world without 
privacy, what good is a reasonable expectation of privacy test?196 
It is worth mentioning the social and economic value behind recent 
shifts in technology. The value of developments in social media is 
inherent in their ability to promote the formations of friendships and 
the facilitation of political advocacy.197 Further, recent 
communication developments provide great economic value. 
	
192 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring). 
193 Id. 
194 See Ohm, supra note 14, at 1329. 
195 Id. at 1311. 
196 But see Nick Bilton, Privacy Isn’t Dead. Just Ask Google+, N.Y. TIMES BITS (July 
18, 2011, 12:59 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/18/privacy-isnt-dead-just-ask 
-google/?pagemode=print. 
197 See Kerry Hearings, supra note 35, at 4. 
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Developments such as location data collected from cell phones allow 
companies tremendous flexibility in how they manage and store data, 
relate to customers, and assemble their workforces.198 Thus, the 
importance of maintaining a specific type of relationship between a 
government and its people has collateral value, both economically and 
socially. 
While we may be moving away from a society that values privacy 
over the benefits of constant connection, it is important to remember 
what the Fourth Amendment was designed to address: the relationship 
that a government should have with its people. In this context, privacy 
is merely a proxy for this relationship, albeit an outdated one. Two 
common misconceptions regarding privacy will help clarify this 
point: first, that the intimate details of people’s lives are already 
exposed; and second, that individuals with nothing to hide should not 
fear governmental surveillance. 
First, many people believe that information about their lives is 
already “out there.”199 This follows the prevailing rationale behind 
the third-party doctrine. That is, if we expose significant portions of 
our lives to private entities, then why should the government, who is 
charged with our safety, be denied access to that information?200 
Professor William Stuntz takes this position and views the support for 
privacy as a “disease” that undermines public safety and national 
security in the face of transnational threats and social disorder.201 
But the Fourth Amendment does not directly address information. 
As Professor Ohm notes, if we are focused on information, then in the 
technological age, very little information about ourselves is private. 
Rather, the true core of the Fourth Amendment “offers a guarantee 
	
198 Id.; see also The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Promoting Security and 
Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
111th Cong. 4 (2010) (statement of Brad Smith, Gen. Counsel, Microsoft Corporation) 
(uncertainty about how ECPA applies to various data hinders adoption of new 
technologies by individuals and impedes innovation), available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/10-09-22SmithTestimony.pdf. 
199 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) 
(recognizing that many people view the tradeoff between increased convenience at the 
expense of privacy worthwhile, if not inevitable). 
200 But see id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I for one doubt that people would 
accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of every 
Web site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year.”). 
201 William J. Stuntz, Secret Service: Against Privacy and Transparency, NEW 
REPUBLIC (Apr. 17, 2006), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/against-privacy-and            
-transparency. 
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not merely of secrecy but of personal autonomy.”202 That is, the 
Fourth Amendment mandates that the government may not intrude on 
its citizens’ ability to thrive as independent persons, for such 
intrusions stifle “associational and expressive freedoms.”203 
The second commonly held misconception is that individuals with 
nothing to hide would not object to governmental surveillance. 
However, this logic is deeply flawed. The Fourth Amendment was not 
designed to protect those with something to hide. Rather, the Framers 
intended to protect those very individuals with nothing to hide.204 
Individuals who commit crimes lose their Fourth Amendment 
protections upon a showing of probable cause that a crime has 
occurred.205 Conversely, the Fourth Amendment shields the innocent 
from undue governmental intrusion and thereby preserves the 
relationship between the government and those who have done 
nothing wrong. 
Here, the harm to the general public is the intrusive surveillance 
from the government. Awareness of government surveillance “chills 
associational and expressive freedoms” and alters “the relationship 
between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to 
democratic society.”206 Some scholars have drawn comparisons 
between the government’s surveillance through location data and the 
architecture of a Panopticon prison, a circular prison that is designed 
such that every inmate is potentially observed at all times.207 In 
monitoring location data through cell phones, governmental gaze 
becomes “internalized in the very minds of those subjected to its 
influence as a mechanism of rehabilitative discipline.”208 Targets of 
governmental gaze have no way of knowing if and when they are 
being watched, yet it is commonly understood that you can be tracked 
via cell phones.209 It is this simultaneous dichotomy of surveillance 
	
202 SCHULHOFER, supra note 61, at 6. 
203 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(citing United States v. Cuevas Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., 
concurring)). 
204 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 61, at 171. 
205 Arrests based on probable cause significantly reduce an individual’s privacy 
interest. See generally Maryland v. King, No. 12-207, 23–27 (2013) (recognizing lowered 
expectations of privacy after lawful arrest based on probable cause). 
206 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing Cuevas Perez, 640 F.3d 
at 285 (Flaum, J., concurring)). 
207 See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 55, at 164. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 166. 
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that produces the anxiety that forms the panoptic effect.210 This is 
what Justice William O. Douglas had in mind when he said, 
“[m]onitoring, if prevalent, certainly kills free discourse and 
spontaneous utterances.”211 
Some scholars pose a different theory on the relationship between 
the individual and society. Professor Solove believes that the 
individual’s interest in privacy and society’s interest in privacy are 
interrelated rather than antagonistic.212 Thus, the value of protecting 
the individual is a social one. “Part of what makes a society a good 
place in which to live is the extent to which it allows people freedoms 
from the intrusiveness of others. A society without privacy protection 
would be oppressive.”213 
Some members of the Court have endorsed the normative belief 
that one should be free from persistent visual observation, even when 
in public. Former Chief Justice William Rehnquist has argued that 
some acts, though public, are not expected to be recorded.214 For 
example, driving to a public bar is not necessarily private, but patrons 
would likely feel uneasy if they knew that a police officer was 
recording how many times they went to that bar in a given week.215 
Justice Rehnquist suggests that perhaps the focus should not be on the 
individual interest asserted, but rather, the government interest 
justifying the action.216 
B. Legitimate Government Interests 
The government has a legitimate interest in obtaining location data 
in criminal investigations and also in ensuring public safety. When 
location data is immediately accessible, law enforcement can deploy 
resources effectively “without placing officers, or the public, at undue 
risk.”217 Access to location data has reduced the amount of time it 
takes for the U.S. Marshals to find fugitives from forty-two days to 
	
210 Id. at 167. 
211 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 762 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
212 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING To HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY 
AND SECURITY 49 (2011). 
213 Id. at 50. 
214 William H. Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair and 
Effective Law Enforcement? Or: Privacy, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby, 23 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 1, 10 (1974). 
215 Id. 
216 Id. at 11. 
217 Baker Statement, supra note 11, at 5. 
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two.218 Further, location data helped law enforcement find the main 
plotter of the September 11th terrorist attacks and one of the July 21st 
London bombers after the suspect had fled to Rome.219 Importantly, 
location data can provide special assistance in cases of kidnapping 
and missing persons.220 Thus, any restrictions on law enforcement to 
quickly and efficiently determine the general locations of criminal 
activity may have a very direct cost in terms of the governments 
ability to safely and efficiently ensure public safety. 
Some scholars argue that in the information age, as criminals begin 
to use sophisticated technology to avoid detection, the government 
should also be able to use such technology to aid in the apprehension 
of suspects. In an argument in favor of the third-party doctrine, 
Professor Orin Kerr believes that the Fourth Amendment should not 
prevent technology from giving criminals a leg up on avoiding 
detection.221 It was once true that criminals had to perform physical 
acts to carry out their plots, but now, these acts can be performed 
behind computers in an attempt to conceal their actions.222 In this 
context, the third-party doctrine is necessary to level the playing field. 
This principle was recognized in Skinner. “When criminals use 
modern technological devices to carry out criminal acts and to reduce 
the possibility of detection, they can hardly complain when the police 
take advantage of the inherent characteristics of those very devices to 
catch them.”223 Indeed, location data is most useful in the early stages 
of a criminal investigation, when the government lacks probable 
cause to obtain a warrant.224 
In a world where privacy is not significantly valued, some do not 
find it unreasonable for law enforcement to utilize location data while 
in pursuit of terrorists and criminals.225 In arguing that our concept of 
	
218 Landau Hearing, supra note 9, at 2. 
219 Id. 
220 See Lynne Terry, Washington Police Used Cell Phone Pings to Zero in on Fugitive 
in Amber Alert, OREGONLIVE.COM (Mar. 2, 2011, 5:44 PM, updated Mar. 3, 2011, 6:01 
AM), http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2011/03/washington 
_police_used_cell_phone_pings_to_zero_in_on_fugitive_in_amber_alert.html. 
221 Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 580 
(2009). 
222 Id. at 576. 
223 United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 774 (6th Cir. 2012). 
224 See Baker Statement, supra note 11, at 4. 
225 Kozinski, supra note 42, at 124. 
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privacy has gotten out of hand, Justice Rehnquist urged for a return to 
the core area of privacy: the person, house, papers, or effects.226 
Justice Rehnquist also posits that law enforcement is necessary for 
our society to have privacy.227 Privacy is justified by civil liberties, 
which rely upon a self-governing society.228 If we adopt the view that 
law-enforcement is necessary for a self-governing society, then civil 
liberties can only exist in a society maintained by public order.229 
Of course, there are other recognized benefits of governmental 
access to location data. First, a digitally efficient investigative state 
reduces criminal activity.230 If individuals recognize that their 
movements are being monitored regularly, they will be less likely to 
engage in criminal activity for fear of being apprehended.231 Further, 
effective investigation of crime has a budgetary impact. Not only is it 
cheaper to monitor individuals through technology as opposed to 
assigning law enforcement to trail a particular suspect, but the 
taxpayers will also be spared expenses caused by property crimes.232 
Given that the United States spent over $98 billion on policing and 
over $46 billion on the judiciary in 2007, the budgetary consequences 
of restraining governmental access to location data cannot be 
ignored.233 
V 
TOWARDS A BALANCED APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
TO LOCATION DATA 
In Jones, five members of the Court expressed their concerns that 
the application of the trespass doctrine to the modern era is 
inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment. In particular, Justice 
Sotomayor’s concurring opinion, as well as Justice Alito’s concurring 
opinion (joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice 
	
226 Rehnquist, supra note 214, at 3. 
227 Id. at 21–22. 
228 Id. at 22. 
229 Id. 
230 Rushin, supra note 14, at 294. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. (detailing studies that indicate surveillance technology substantially deters 
property crime); see also Crime in the United States, 2011: Property Crime, FED. BUREAU 
OF INVESTIGATION (finding that property crimes in 2011 resulted in an estimated loss of 
$15.6 billion), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s. 
-2011/property-crime/propertycrimemain_final.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2013). 
233 Rushin, supra note 14, at 297. 
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Kagan), suggests that when the Court hears the issue of location data, 
a new approach may be necessary. 
This section will begin by reviewing an approach that is gaining 
prominence among scholars: the Mosaic Theory. The conclusion of 
this section then proposes a new standard that balances the interests of 
privacy activists and legitimate government interests. 
A. The Mosaic Theory 
According to the Mosaic Theory, whether government conduct 
amounts to a search does not depend upon whether a particular 
individual act is a search, but rather, whether an entire course of 
conduct, viewed collectively, amounts to a search.234 Thus, individual 
acts that may not be searches on their own accord may rise to the 
level of a search when committed in particular combinations. 
The rationale behind the Mosaic Theory can be linked to the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test. It is not reasonable to expect 
that the totality of one’s movements would be monitored by a 
member of the public.235 Thus, under the Mosaic Theory, a person 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the totality of his 
movements made in public if the aggregation of those movements 
was made possible through technological means.236 
The Mosaic Theory has gained prominence from the courts. Before 
reaching the Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit applied the Mosaic 
Theory to Jones.237 In concluding that long-term GPS surveillance of 
movements exposed to the public view was a search, the D.C. Circuit 
reasoned that prolonged surveillance revealed information 
substantively different than short-term surveillance.238 In particular, a 
person who knows the totality of another person’s movements is able 
to determine whether someone is a “weekly church goer, a heavy 
drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient 
receiving medical treatment, an associate of particular individuals or 
political groups—and not just one such fact about a person, but all 
such facts.”239 
	
234 Bethany L. Dickman, Untying Knotts: The Application of Mosaic Theory to GPS 
Surveillance in United States v. Maynard, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 731, 736 (2011). 
235 Walsh, supra note 50, at 233. 
236 Id. 
237 See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
238 Id. 
239 Id. 
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The Mosaic Theory also has some support from members of the 
Supreme Court. Justice Alito, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, 
and Kagan, came to the conclusion that “the use of longer term GPS 
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on 
expectations of privacy.”240 Additionally, Justice Sotomayor 
explicitly endorsed this language from Justice Alito’s concurrence.241 
The primary criticism of the Mosaic Theory is that it remains 
largely unworkable in the absence of bright-line rules.242 That is, at 
what point would a series of acts trigger the Mosaic Theory?243 There 
is some guidance from Justice Alito, who does not answer the 
question directly but does tell us “the line was surely crossed before 
the [four]-week mark.”244 Unfortunately, Justice Alito’s concurrence 
ultimately perpetuates the confusion surrounding the standard for law 
enforcement to access location data. As the Solicitor General stated in 
his brief, “the ‘mosaic’ theory is unworkable. Law enforcement 
officers could not predict when their observations of public 
movements would yield a larger pattern and convert legitimate short-
term surveillance into a search.”245 
B. A Practical and Balanced Approach 
In proposing a workable application of the Fourth Amendment to 
the government’s access to location data, this Comment seeks to 
strike a balance between legitimate governmental interests and the 
right to be free from undue governmental intrusion. The original 
ECPA was a compromise between these two competing, yet equal 
interests.246 Further, the tension between these interests has existed 
even before the technological age. Justice Rehnquist noted that in the 
	
240 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
241 Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I agree with Justice Alito that, at the very 
least, ‘longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on 
expectations of privacy.”). 
242 See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (acknowledging the 
importance of translating the Fourth Amendment into rules that law enforcement can 
predictably apply). 
243 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 55, at 147. 
244 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
245 Brief for the United States at 14, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 
10-1259). 
246 See The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Government Perspectives on 
Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
112th Cong. 3 (2011) (opening statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg70856/pdf/CHRG-112shrg70856.pdf. 
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history of political theory and constitutional law, the concern for 
individual liberty (freedom) has competed with the need for the 
government to remain responsive to the public’s needs.247 A free 
society seeks to achieve a balance between these two principles 
because unregulated freedom results in anarchy, while absolute order 
is despotism.248 
While it exceeds the scope of this Comment, it is worth 
recognizing the ongoing debate regarding whether it should be up to 
Congress or the Court to decide what is an appropriate balance.249 
Because there are several members of the Court who believe that the 
legislature is in the best position to act, this Comment will defer to the 
legislature.250 
Given that there are two ways to obtain location data, this 
Comment will propose a dual standard. First, in order to obtain 
precise location data (via GPS, triangulation, etc.), the government 
must obtain a warrant by providing specific and articulable facts 
demonstrating probable cause that a crime has been committed. 
Further, the location data sought must be reasonably related to the 
ongoing investigation. This probable cause standard protects the 
intimate details that are revealed by our location, minimizing undue 
surveillance that “chills associational and expressive freedoms.”251 It 
further tailors the scope of the information gathered to a level that is 
reasonable to the needs of the investigation. 
The government’s interest in law enforcement is satisfied because 
police will have access to a reasonable scope of location data upon a 
showing of probable cause. In fact, this standard is consistent with 
	
247 Rehnquist, supra note 214, at 2. 
248 Id. 
249 Compare SOLOVE, supra note 212, at 165–66 (arguing that the court should devise a 
standard because (1) Congress has failed to regulate many new technologies; (2) statutes 
are often as unclear as the Fourth Amendment; and (3) courts can quickly update rules as 
technology shifts), with Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: 
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 868–75 (2004) 
(arguing that legislatures should regulate new technologies because (1) courts are confined 
to deciding disputes from past events and thus cannot be forward thinking; (2) limitations 
caused by stare decisis limit the ability of judicial rules to change quickly; and (3) 
legislative rules tend to incorporate information from wide sources of information while 
courts are restrained to briefs and oral arguments by two parties). 
250 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (recognizing that the legislature 
is best suited to “gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance 
privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way”). 
251 Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Cuevas Perez, 640 
F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)). 
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U.S. Department of Justice standards, which dictate that investigators 
must have probable cause to obtain a warrant for GPS information.252 
Thus, this proposal codifies existing Department of Justice policy. 
Additionally, this standard has found support in some courts, where it 
has already been concluded that applications seeking GPS data may 
be granted only after a showing of probable cause.253 
Second, in order to access network-based location data, the 
government must obtain a warrant based on reasonable suspicion that 
a crime has been committed. Network-based location data is much 
less precise than GPS/triangulation location data and tends to reveal 
only the cell phone’s general vicinity. Thus, it does not reveal the 
intimate details that accompany knowledge of precise location. 
Accordingly, the burden for law enforcement should be lower. 
Because location data is crucial in the beginning stages of an 
investigation, a lower threshold will allow law enforcement to more 
efficiently gather evidence leading to probable cause. This lowered 
standard for general location data is also consistent with existing 
Department of Justice policy.254 
Thus, while the dual standard proposed in this Comment is not 
necessarily new, the legislature or the Supreme Court has not 
permanently codified it. This Comment therefore recommends the 
formal adoption of this standard in order to provide a clear, uniform, 
and balanced application of the Fourth Amendment to location data. 
The Supreme Court should also abandon the distinction between 
protected spaces and public spaces in the context of location data 
emitted from smartphones for two reasons. First, only precise location 
data (such as GPS data) has the potential to reveal details regarding a 
protected space. Under the balanced approach, law enforcement must 
present probable cause that a crime has been committed. Thus, 
because law enforcement will already have presented probable cause 
to obtain this data, government monitoring of protected spaces would 
not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
	
252 Baker Testimony, supra note 75, at 8. 
253 See In re Application of the U.S. Authorizing the Release of Historic Cell-Site Info., 
809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 118–19 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (explaining records sought that captured 
enough of the user’s location information for a long enough time period to depict a 
sufficiently detailed and intimate picture of his movements required probable cause 
showing); see also In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 
2d 827, 835 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 
254 See Baker Testimony, supra note 75, at 20. 
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Second, network-based location information is not sufficiently 
precise to reveal a phone’s location within a particular private 
space.255 Based on the reasoning in Karo, the government’s collection 
of network-based location data would not violate Fourth Amendment 
protections, even when the phone happens to be located in a private 
space, because the location data would not allow the government to 
know it is in any particular private space.256 
Perhaps, more radically, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence should 
stop treating secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy.257 This position has 
support from at least one member of the Court, as Justice Sotomayor 
would not “assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some 
member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, 
disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”258 
Given that various Justices have recognized that the length of 
surveillance is a critical factor in determining the legality of electronic 
surveillance,259 the warrant should be issued for a period that is no 
greater than the amount of time reasonable to allow law enforcement 
to carry out the investigation. This period should not exceed thirty 
days, at which point the government may seek a renewal of the 
warrant by providing affidavits that the investigation is still ongoing. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite recent technological advances, the body of law regarding 
the Fourth Amendment’s approach to location data has remained 
relatively unchanged. As discussed, a review of Fourth Amendment 
doctrine reveals that there is no uniform, defined standard for law 
enforcement to obtain location data. Further, principles such as the 
plain view doctrine and the third-party doctrine complicate the 
analysis when advanced technologies enter the picture. 
Because the scholarly discussion about these issues has remained 
largely hostile to the legitimate interests of law enforcement, this 
Comment proposes a new standard that balances the concern for 
	
255 Walsh, supra note 50, at 239. 
256 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984). 
257 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(“Privacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all. Those who 
disclose certain facts to a bank or phone company for a limited business purpose need not 
assume that this information will be released to other persons for other purposes.”). 
258 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
259 See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 955 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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individual liberty and the equal yet competing governmental interest 
to remain responsive to public safety. While this approach was 
designed to reflect Fourth Amendment principles, it was not only 
inspired by what has been, it also contemplates what may be. 
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